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Introduction 
 
Inter-related civil wars in Liberia (from 1989), Sierra Leone (from 1991) 
and Cote d’Ivoire (from 2002) have attracted various explanations.   One 
briefly influential theory suggested “new war” was a post-Cold War 
upsurge of African barbarism (Kaplan 1994).  Other accounts have 
stressed economic motivations (Berdal & Malone 2001; Collier 2000).  
Every war needs resources, but whether economics is a sufficient cause 
of war is controversial.  There seems little evidence the West African 
wars were started by economic competition alone, and the “greed, not 
grievance” hypothesis has lost some of its shine. Cultural determinism, 
by contrast, continues to attract adherents (Huntington 2000).  One 
account of the war in Liberia (Ellis 1999) links the violence to 
“privatization” of ideas about human sacrifice associated with Poro (the 
male initiation association).  Those who consider culture effect, not 
cause, will be anxious to examine other approaches (Kuper 1999).  This 
paper outlines an institutional approach, with an emphasis on the rural 
background of the armed factions in the war in Sierra Leone.  
Explanation focuses on the evolution of agrarian labour from “domestic 
slavery” in the late 19th century through “community work” and “bride 
service” in the colonial period to a predatory exploitation of uneducated 
rural youth today. 
 
 
“Lumpen” violence? 
 
There is agreement  the civil war in Sierra Leone (1991-2002) represents 
a crisis of youth.  Some see urban drop-outs as major protagonists. 
Abdullah (1997), Abdullah & Muana (1998) and Rashid (1997) substitute 
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the word lumpens for the more usual rareh, a Krio word apparently 
derived from the mispronunciation by 18th Century Savoyard entertainers 
in London of the English word “rare” (as applied to the delights on offer in 
their street shows).  The rareh in Sierra Leone are urban youth of “no 
fixed abode”.  Applied to a male, the term implies a lay-about or petty 
criminal, and to a female, a commercial sex worker.  Rareh were 
recruited as election thugs under the regime of Siaka Stevens (1968-
1985).  The military regimes of 1992-96 (the National Provisional Ruling 
Council) and 1997-98 (the Armed Forces Ruling Council) also inducted 
rareh from impoverished East Freetown into the ranks of the army. 
 
That the Revolutionary United Front (henceforth RUF) was also a 
movement of “lumpens” is an assumption that occurs readily to 
commentators of the Sierra Leonean diaspora, many with urban 
backgrounds (Abdullah & Muana 1998).  Some have carried out 
research on urban youth, and some suffered at the hands of the “thugs” 
recruited by Siaka Stevens.  It was easy to suppose the brutal RUF was 
a recurrence of a strategy by which some sections of the elite have 
sought to maintain a grip on political power (Kandeh 2000).  Some 
commentators, additionally, were anxious to establish a clear “break” 
between their own radical political activities in the 1970s and ‘80s and 
the RUF’s naive and “improper” use of the same revolutionary teachings 
(notably the Libyan Green Book and the writings of Kim Il Sung on 
guerrilla warfare). 
 
The present essay explores the implications of a different finding - that 
the majority of the RUF were, in fact, young people of rural backgrounds, 
and that among the RUF leadership there was an “intellectual” core with 
a belief in tackling the country’s problems not just through revolution 
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(hence Revolutionary United Front) but specifically through agrarian 
revolution (Richards 1996, Richards et al. 2003).  Food security, not 
diamonds, was the motivation claimed by the RUF, and a number of 
senior cadres have gone on, through demobilization opportunities, to 
establish social programmes for agriculture. 
 
 
Detached agrarian youth (and a Zimbabwean parallel) 
 
I will not dwell on the ideology of agrarian revolution, since the evidence 
is summed up in a paper in preparation by Krijn Peters based on 
interviews with some of the wartime leadership of the RUF.  What I want 
to examine here is the social and historical background to RUF 
identification with “the agrarian question”, and why agrarian revolution 
might appeal to rural youth in Sierra Leone.  There are parallels in my 
argument for Sierra Leone to the diagnosis Norma Kriger (1992) offers of 
the guerrilla war in Zimbabwe.  Kriger studied under what conditions the 
peasantry allied with or resisted the Zanu-PF guerrillas.  She concludes, 
for her sample, that “settled” peasants - i.e. those with land and families - 
either resisted Zanu or aligned with the movement only under pressure, 
but that the main supporters of the guerrilla were to be found among the 
ranks of the young people, and especially among those who lacked the 
land or other resources to marry and settle to the peasant good life.  
Similarly, I shall suggest that the recruits to the RUF were, in the main, 
young people marginalised from the rural agrarian structure by others 
more centrally placed within a decaying rural system. In itself this is 
perhaps not a very surprising claim.  The army is often an option for the 
rural unemployed, and young people with few social commitments tend 
to be high risk takers.  But what made some rural young people in Sierra 
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Leone rally to a movement promising deep agrarian reforms was the way 
a national political system preoccupied by wealth from diamonds “by-
passes” rural administration, forcing its agents (chiefs and elders, 
themselves marginalized by years of neglect), to intensify “traditional” 
modalities for the exploitation of the labour of young people.  The 
practices in question are rooted in the institutions of domestic slavery 
widespread in the Upper Guinean forest zone in the pre-colonial period, 
but prolonged by British colonial indirect rule.  Rural squalor and 
diamond wealth flow in separate circuits.  The diamond elite uses its 
money to import foreign food rather than secure it from local agriculture. 
The countryside suffered an arrested development, and the resulting 
sense of political community divided implacably into worlds of “haves” 
and “have nots” resurrected some of the resentments associated with an 
era of servitude not yet quite banished from living memory (domestic 
slavery was ended only in 1928).  The resulting explosion has displayed 
some of the society-overturning violence of a classic slave revolt.  As a 
movement the RUF was a brutal failure.  But the problem of agrarian 
opportunities it tried to address remains.  The key to preventing war in 
Sierra Leone, and perhaps more widely in the West African region, it is 
suggested, is institutional reform in the countryside that concedes to  
young people greater control over their own labour power. 
 
 
Bringing grievance back in 
 
The paper amounts to an explanation of the war in Sierra Leone in terms 
of “grievance”, not “greed”. A consequence of a forced division of labour 
(as Durkheim clearly understood [Durkheim 1893]) is low societal regard 
for the efforts of uneducated rural youth.  Those of no account hunger to 
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be noticed.  The war in Sierra Leone, it is here argued, is less about 
diamonds than respect.   The grievance is perhaps the oldest in the book 
- the notion that violence can compensate a lack of social esteem.1  But it 
is also suggested that violence, as a reaction to grievances, is blind - 
conniving at the reconstitution of the very grievances it seeks to 
eradicate. 
 
The exposition proceeds in two steps.  First, evidence is presented that 
the RUF acquired volunteer adherents mainly from rural communities in 
which institutional practices rooted in domestic slavery survived longest, 
and that these adherents cite the exploitation of their labour by elders as 
a factor in joining the movement.  Second, it is noted that these practices 
of exploitation emerged as adaptations to late 19th century insecurity, and 
that by disorganising the countryside the RUF itself helped create 
conditions for the re-emergence of exactly the oppressive institutional 
arrangements against which it fought, helping perpetuate conditions for 
disaffection.  New approaches to the agrarian question need to be tried. 
 
 
RUF volunteers 
 
Like the Lord’s Resistance Army in Uganda, the RUF became infamous 
for building its movement through abducting young people.  Recruitment 
by capture occurred from the outset, the RUF believing that malleable 
young people would become loyalists when they fully understood the 
movement’s message.  Others joined, as they themselves say, “by 
                                                          
1 In the Book of Genesis Cain killed his brother Abel because Cain’s sacrifice was not acceptable to God.  Durkheim taught 
that our sense of the sacred is a way of recognising society as a distinct reality, independent of (though sustained only by) 
individuals.  If we accept Durkheim’s notion of the societal origins of the sacred then Cain’s violence stemmed from his lack 
of social esteem. 
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adoption”, i.e. they were fleeing atrocities committed by the government 
forces.  Recruitment by capture or “adoption” tends to obscure evidence 
of significant voluntary adherence. 
 
Recent fieldwork in northern Kailahun and south-eastern Pujehun District 
(May-July 2003) provided more evidence of willing adhesion than earlier 
apparent.  There were many volunteers to the movement from among 
young people in the most isolated parts of the populous Kailahun District 
and in border villages in Pujehun devastated by political thuggery and 
the operations of an unofficial anti-smuggling force during the 1980s. 
 
The movement was well prepared.  Its advance guard had spied upon 
local disputes before the rebellion was launched.  I met one of these 
spies in Waiwayehun, an enclave in the Gola Forest, in 1989, when he 
gave me, after a suspicious grilling, a long and surprisingly well-informed 
account of colonial intrigue in re-delimiting the international border in 
1911.  Colonialism divided many border families, and excluded some 
from chieftaincy, resulting in a long history of dissidence by certain local 
land-owning groups. 
 
This dissidence was exploited by the RUF in its own attempts to divide 
and rule.  A number of chiefs in Kailahun District, for example, refusing to 
recognise British overrule in 1896, and prevented from contesting 
colonial chieftaincy elections, developed a nomadic existence, in villages 
strung across the Liberian, Guinean and Sierra Leonean borders.  
Sandeyalu, bordering Luawa and Kissi Teng chiefdoms, was one in a 
chain of such dissident locales.  Perhaps not accidentally, it was 
occupied by the RUF as its headquarters for about ten months in1993. 
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A number of larger Kailahun villages were controlled by the RUF through 
their knowledge of factional tensions, and these settlements today 
remain divided into pro- and anti-RUF factions.  But this is in contrast to 
some of the smaller off-road villages, where young people tend to be 
nearly 100 per cent ex-RUF.  The point about these smaller villages is 
that these were, by origin, the farm camps inhabited by domestic slaves.  
This offers an hypothesis to test - that there is a correlation between 
RUF activity and a high former incidence of domestic slavery. 
 
 
The legacy of domestic slavery in Sierra Leone 
 
It is first important to know that domestic slavery lasted an unusually long 
time in Sierra Leone, and that even in its last days (in the 1920s) it was a 
far from benign institution.  The threat (through the imposition of the 
Protectorate Ordinance of 1896) that the British would deprive Mende 
chiefs of their domestic slaves was a factor in the uprising of 1898.  It 
was fear of recurrence - during a period of rapid colonial expansion in 
West Africa - that was in the minds of British administrators in Sierra 
Leone when they argued slavery was a dying institution, vainly hoping it 
could be left safely to expire. 
 
Closer to Freetown it did indeed decline sharply, because slaves could 
find paid work in the city.  But slaves in the more remote districts had 
less opportunity to find paid work.  Forced labour - work extracted for a 
subsistence wage, and with legal sanctions - continued unabated.  Thus 
arose a great paradox of British colonial rule in Sierra Leone - a colony 
founded as a home for freed slaves in 1787 became (in the surrounding 
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protectorate) one of the last parts of British Africa to outlaw domestic 
slavery (January 1st 1928). 
 
The continued assertion by chiefs and land owners of rights to mobilize 
unwaged labour was, in fact, functional to the rural economic revolution 
stimulated along the Liberian border by the arrival of the railway in 
Pendembu in 1911.  The first roads feeding the new railway were made 
through the obligatory community labour of young men, with severe 
punishments (the whip and stocks) for absenteeism (Stocks are still to be 
seen in active deployment in some parts of rural Sierra Leone today).  
Cash-crop plantations were laid through the unpaid efforts of young men 
tied to lineage elders in “bride service”, or in work supplied in lieu of 
payment of fines imposed for “woman damage” (adultery), a tort 
enforced by customary courts.  Prodding by the League of Nations finally 
forced the British to legislate for abolition and to qualify the 
circumstances under which chiefs could command the unpaid labour of 
young men (Fenton 1943). 
 
Grace (1977), an historian of domestic slavery in Sierra Leone, makes 
clear that far from moribund, the institution was actively preserved until 
the last.  He notes that chiefdom court records in Pujehun District in the 
1920s show petitions for recovery of domestic slaves to be among the 
more prominent items of court business.  At abolition, up to 50 per cent 
of all persons in some chiefdoms bordering Liberia were slaves.  The 
clustering of the RUF in farm villages in Kailahun and Pujehun Districts, 
where voluntary adhesion was strongest, might reflect the fact that these 
isolated places were more easily defended by the movement against the 
army, but they also happen to be, in the main, the redoubts of the former 
household slaves. 
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Tied labour, bride service and court fines 
 
The intricacies of domestic slavery in the Sierra Leone/Liberia border 
region are expounded in Holsoe’s analysis of the institution among the 
Vai, a people who straddle Pujehun District in Sierra Leone and Grand 
Cape Mount County in Liberia (Holsoe 1977).   He describes four classes 
of jonnu, or tied or dependent (persons lacking full kinship status) in Vai 
society.  One of the four is the war captive.  These were the people most 
liable to harsh treatment, especially where acquired at a distance and 
placed in separate farm settlements, the origin of many subordinate 
villages dotting the Vai countryside today.   
 
Particularly interesting among Holsoe’s other categories is the young 
man who tries to evade the control of elders over the rights of sexual 
access to young women.  The crime of “woman damage” (adultery) led 
to the punishment of “women servitude”, in which the miscreant paid off 
this debt by labouring on the farm of the offended husband.  Typically, 
the man benefiting from “woman servitude” would be an elderly and 
wealthy polygynist.  The young man might be offered his lover in 
marriage, but then had to work for his “father-in-law” for many years to 
work off his debt. 
 
The charge of woman damage is still frequent in customary courts in 
Sierra Leone today.  Those convicted sometimes complain that the 
plaintiff is several times married not for reproductive reasons but simply 
to ensure a “tied” labour force.  The lover works for the offended party, 
and will lose any child born of the relationship to the legal husband.  High 
and arbitrary fining for “woman damage”, among other torts, is a factor 
frequently cited in our recent research on the causes of the war, when 
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we invite discussion on why some young men quit the village and joined 
the RUF (Archibald and Richards 2002). 
 
The testimony of one young RUF ex-combatant interviewed in Tongo 
Field, July 2003 (Richards et al. 2003) serves to sum up the voices of 
many: 
 
 “I am from B. in Nongowa Chiefdom.  We have problems 
with our elders in that village....They force young men to 
marry their daughters as soon as we harvest our first 
bunch of palm fruits.  If you refuse they cause more 
problems for you than even being in the bush as a rebel.  
They charge you to court for smiling at a girl, saying they 
had offered you a girl and you refused...But the bride price 
is not reasonable.  You will be required to do all sorts of 
physical jobs for the bride’s family, like brushing and 
making a farm for the family, offering your energy in the 
form of labour to build houses for them, and sharing the 
proceeds of your own labour, harvest or business, three-
quarters to them, one quarter for you.  For example, if you 
process one [50 gallon] drum of palm oil you will be forced 
to give them 35 gallons [70%], or you will lose your wife 
and be taken to court for breach of contract... What most of 
us have done is to avoid the scene...here [in the diamond 
pits of Tongo] you can get some respite and marry a 
woman of your choice.  In B. marriage is synonymous to 
slavery.” 
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Let us add a woman’s voice.  A young wife interviewed in an off-road 
part of Kamajei Chiefdom, in central Sierra Leone, September 2003, 
joked with us about whether it was preferable to be married to a  young 
(but poor) or older (but wealthier) husband (Richards et al. 2003).  She 
herself had been married two years ago (at age 15, the average age for 
marriage of girls in the area) to a young man.  Of course it is preferable 
to have a young husband.  But she readily agreed it would be hard for 
her man to get his own farm.  Because of bride service he would work for 
her father and brothers for many years to come.  In fact, for the rest of 
his life, she added, laughing.  Yes, he would remain poor.  But then her 
children would marry, and her husband could rest on the bride service 
the daughters would attract.  She had missed her chance to go to school.  
Her best interests were now served by maintaining the old subsistence-
oriented status quo.         
 
The following six comments are extracts from more extensive interviews 
with ex-combatants compiled by Krijn Peters, Steve Archibald and Paul 
Richards at various times between May 2000 to November 2003.  They 
substantiate points made above about voluntary adherence to the RUF, 
the problem of high and arbitrary fines in customary courts, and the link 
that rural young people trace between exploitation of the labour of 
commoners by chiefs and outbreak of war (for sources see Archibald & 
Richards 2002): 
 
 - “I joined the rebels purposely because of difficulties 
we were having. We were suffering too much. The RUF 
was encouraging us to help them in their fight so that later 
we could enjoy a proper life...there were about 20 young 
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boys and girls in my village - 7 girls and 13 boys, who 
joined the RUF willingly, without force”. 
 
 - “The main reason [i joined] was the lack of job 
facilities and lack of encouragement for the youth. [This 
was] why the RUF [was] fighting.” 
 
- “[The chiefs] levy high fines on the youth, if 
you are sent to do a job and you refuse. Up till 
now the chiefs are pressuring us. They can 
summon[s] you...making you to pay a lot...” 
 
 - “Chiefs protect their own children from doing 
communal work.” 
 
 - “Our chiefs... were doing wrong to our young men and 
women...some young men prefer[red] to go and join the 
RUF, either to take revenge or to protect themselves.”  
 
 - “[Things are changing now, because] we have a 
democratic government and we have to fight for our 
rights....if you, as a bad chief, will send us anywhere to 
brush some land or do some other work, we will refuse. 
...you may summon us to the highest authority but...we will 
explain what you have done to us.” 
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A war rooted in slavery?  
 
The argument implicit in these statements might be summarised thus.  
Domestic slavery (prolonged under colonialism) sustained an 
expectation that community elders and other prominent people had 
certain rights to use the labour of young people freely.  Born in the class 
distinctions of a slave society, these expectations have not been dulled, 
as we might otherwise expect, by an active rural labour market, due to 
the weakness of rural development in Sierra Leone.  This weakness 
reflected massive government corruption and a focus of entrepreneurial 
attention on the diamond sector. Mining was no stimulus to rural food 
production because wealth from diamonds mainly accumulated 
overseas.  Mining entrepreneurs (including figures in government and 
the security services) used overseas wealth to import food rather than 
seek local sources.  The rural economy stagnated. 
 
Young people without education and unable to move to towns for work 
found themselves all too often working for elders without wages.  A 
particular flash point was “community work”.  Colonialism sought to 
regulate the rights of chiefs to extract community work (Mende: ta yenge) 
and sacked chiefs guilty of abusing such labour for private ends.  These 
controls loosened in the post-colonial period, as chieftaincy became 
corrupted by politics, and the rule of law was abandoned.  Opposition in 
Kailahun and parts of Pujehun Districts in the 1970s to the regime of 
Siaka Stevens caused Freetown to cut back on normal investments in 
road repairs, schools and salaries, in the hope of coercing political 
compliance.  Chiefs came to be seen either as Freetown stooges, or 
predatory on young people as they sought to make good the loss of 
revenue and services from central government ([The chiefs] levy high 
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fines on the youth, if you are sent to do a job and you refuse...making 
you to pay a lot...). 
 
The modern trend in rural development worsened the situation by 
stressing the dogma of “participation” or “community-driven 
development”.  This requires a local contribution, generally given in kind 
(labour and food), to unlock development funds from NGO sources 
(which otherwise might have been an antidote to the discriminatory 
distribution of government funds for social services in the pre-war 
period).  The children of the rural elite escaped the obligations to provide 
“community labour” by being sent to school in town.  The burdens fell 
more and more on the uneducated youths left behind (Chiefs protect 
their own children from doing communal work).  Rising resentment on 
the part of this “abandoned” class peaked where benefits from 
“participatory” development projects were seen to pass corruptly into 
private hands (our chiefs... were doing wrong to our young men and 
women...). 
 
Stories about the legacy of slavery took on a new resonance (Richards 
1996, Shaw 2002).  The RUF itself told such stories as part of its 
propaganda against corruption, injustice and the educational deprivation 
of the poor (Richards 1996).  The movement acquired some of the 
vengeful destructiveness of a slave revolt (some young men prefer[red] 
to go and join the RUF...to take revenge...).  Cadres speak about the gun 
as a means of ending shame and instilling respect (cf. Keen 2004).  For 
Durkheim (1893) a “forced division of labour” is a social pathology that 
leads towards civil war, because it does not inculcate the mutual 
tolerance found in a community where talent is freely expressed. 
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The alienation arising from a “forced” division of labour, and lack of 
opportunity for many rural young people, has not been resolved by the 
ending of the war, even if the trend (for a time) is to seek more peaceful 
weapons (we have a democratic government and we have to fight for our 
rights....if you, as a bad chief, will send us anywhere to brush some land 
or do some other work, we will refuse. ...you may summon us to the 
highest authority but...we will explain). 
 
 
The Cote d’Ivoire connection - an old argument revived 
 
Thus there is at least a prima facie case for taking the exploitation of the 
labour of rural youth seriously as a cause of the war in Sierra Leone.  It is 
not, of course, a new line of argument.  Exploitation of the labour of 
cadets by elders was a theme strongly advanced in the work of some 
members of the French neo-marxist school of anthropology in the 1960s.  
Several adherents of this school did their field work in Cote d’Ivoire, 
where a conflict with some connections to the one in Sierra Leone has 
arisen since 2002.  Some RUF rebels have ended up fighting for similar 
groups in Cote d’Ivoire.  Diamond mining is not a connecting thread, but 
agrarian issues are.  Chauveau (2003) carefully exposes the way the 
evolution of the tutorat (an institution controlling access to land by in-
migrants) contributes to the current political tensions in that country. 
 
The agrarian theme surfaces in the account one young RUF commander 
recently gave us of his life story (Richards et al 2003).  After secondary 
schooling in Liberia (where his father had been driven by Sierra Leonean 
politics) he moved to Abidjan where he mixed with university students 
keen to improve their English, ending up growing cabbages (with one of 
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his “pupils”) in the village of the late Ivoirian military leader Robert Guei. 
When he joined the RUF he was sent for ideological training to a unit run 
by a lecturer from the Kailahun District community teacher training 
college at Bunumbu, Ibrahim Deen-Jalloh.  The course, he told us, 
stressed leadership and community mobilization around agrarian issues.  
The aim of the RUF was rural reform.  In demobilization he now heads a 
rural farm development programme for about 60 former comrades and 
over 600 villagers in the Magburaka area, assisted by the Bangladesh 
battalion of the UN peace-keeping forces.  A mass movement for 
agrarian change is his aim.  His comrades confirm they are training to 
spread the message of rural cooperation and self-reliance to all parts of 
the nation.   
 
 
Domestic slavery as an outcome of war 
 
The second part of my argument is functional.  As is the blessing (or 
curse) of functional arguments we can see domestic slavery as both 
cause and consequence of war.2  The supporting evidence covers not 
the period before the war in Sierra Leone, but its aftermath.  The 
demobilization process (from May 2000) is intriguing, because the 
government of President Kabbah cleverly focused not on rewarding its 
own fighters (the long-suffering and ill-equipped Civil Defence Force) but 
on patronising the enemy.  In the “spirit of the gift” it calculated this as a 
way to break the youthful independence of the unruly RUF. 
 
                                                          
2 Held in reserve for another occasion is discussion of a claim that agrarian modernization might eliminate violence from the 
system. 
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Demobilization involved RUF commanders collecting up the guns of their 
fighters and receiving chits for reintegration packages in return.  These 
they were then supposed to distribute to the fighters in question.  As was 
probably anticipated, a number of commanders took the opportunity to 
secure better terms for their own reintegration by mis-using these chits.  
Some went to female partners.  Others went to nominees of the chiefs in 
whose settlements the commanders planned to reintegrate.  But for 
every wrongly-directed chit (and false “ex-combatant”) there was a real 
fighter who lost his or her chance to start a new life.  Some of those 
cheated were strong or resourceful enough to find their own reintegration 
opportunities (some have gone back to diamond mining, others ride 
motor-bike taxis on hire-purchase terms in provincial towns).  But others 
have been less lucky, and have sunk into the rural underclass, in an 
agrarian society undermined by mercantilist politics, in which successive 
diamond-oriented regimes are more interested in feeding their 
supporters from food aid (or imported food) than reorganising and 
modernising the countryside.  New forms of agrarian servitude have 
begun to emerge. 
 
i. Men excluded from demobilization - the case of M. 
 
M. is a former RUF fighter.  A Mende, he was abducted in south of the 
country in one of the RUF’s first sweeps in 1991.  An illiterate teenage 
farm boy, he learned little or nothing of the movement’s ideology.  Most 
such recruits served as porters and labourers in RUF farms.  M. spent 
most of the war as a member of the household of a leading fighter 
(Colonel J.).  His “boss” taught him the rudiments of how to handle a 
weapon (how to “cock and fire”).  Ending the war in possession of a 
semi-automatic M. was qualified to register for demobilization.  Colonel J. 
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collected M.’s weapon, as required by the demobilization programme, 
but registered it in the name of a female companion instead.  J. and his 
girlfriend joined a skills training programme and later settled in the 
diamond fields, opening a small tailoring business.  Without chit, number 
or food, M. was stranded in Magburaka, a Temne town, one of the main 
RUF centres at the end of the war.  He was soon on the verge of 
starvation, and drifted into the countryside looking for casual work.  He 
found an opening in an off-road village about 5 miles north of Magburaka 
where the village head man took him on as his “stranger”.  The chief fed 
M. in return for labour on a large plantation of 22 acres established to 
educate the chief’s children, all away at urban schools.  The work was 
too much for the chief alone, so he was happy for M. to help him. 
 
When we met and interviewed M. (September 2003) he had to all intents 
and purposes slipped into a de facto domestic slavery.  He lived in an 
isolated farm hut on the plantation, 3 miles from the village. Speaking no 
Temne he had few social contacts.  He was reliant on his patron not only 
for food but to pass on any information that might be gleaned from the 
radio about demobilization benefits.  In a voice choking with emotion he 
told us how he had been “robbed” of gun and benefits, was grateful to his 
current “boss” for rescuing him from starvation, but how that, paid only in 
food and tips, he could see no way of ever reintegrating into society, 
except he ran away to the diamond districts to dig, where God might 
grant him his portion.  His ultimate aim was to find his family, from whom 
he had been separated for 12 years.  What he needed was a regular 
wage to be able to contemplate a trip back to the south to search.  His 
father was dead, he knew.  But he hoped his mother was still alive, since 
she had re-married an educated man and moved to Bo, the provincial 
centre of the south (in fact she had died, but two sisters remained at 
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home and were keen to welcome their brother).  But to make the journey 
he needed not only the truck fare (about a week’s wage at the national 
minimum, far beyond his current resources) but also enough to buy 
simple presents (cloth, soap, etc) through which affection and respect 
are conveyed in rural Sierra Leone.  After 12 years of fighting for survival 
with the RUF he was deeply uncertain whether he would be viewed by 
his family as an outcast. 
 
ii. Women excluded from demobilization - forced wives and sex workers 
 
We have collected similar material from young women - many of them 
war widows - associated with the RUF.  Their men were either fighters 
who abandoned them or were killed in fighting, or they were civilians who 
saw there husbands murdered.  At the end of the war they find 
themselves far from home and with no support.  Although the RUF 
recruited heavily in the east, along the Liberian border, at the end of the 
war it mainly controlled an enclave in the north of the country, stretching 
from Makeni to the Kono diamond fields.  Whenever the RUF moved it 
took its (in effect captive) “civil society” with it.  With children to protect, 
but with no access to demobilization benefits, these RUF “war widows” 
have little choice but to opt for a kind of low-status marriage in the rural 
districts in which they currently find themselves.  Village polygynists are 
more than happy to acquire a hard-working wife “for free” and with no 
lineage to protect her interests.  If the escape route for the young men 
like M. “off base” and stranded in rural servitude is to revert to diamond 
digging the escape for these young women is to come to Makeni and 
other main towns and engage in commercial sex work, in the hope that 
something better might one day open up.  Those “afraid” of street life (as 
the women we talked to put it) are in effect condemned to a lifetime of 
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domestic servitude, out of contact with their kin.  It is not the rareh who 
made the war but the war that made the rareh. 
 
J., a woman leader in the RUF who spent the years 1998-2001 in the 
Makeni axis but is now returned to her well-connected political family in 
Kailahun District, told me that the problem was widespread.  Because of 
the way the RUF recruited and moved there were now (she thought) 
thousands of “displaced” young people associated with the rebel 
movement but fallen through the net of demobilization - Mende-speakers 
in Temne areas, Temne-speakers in Mende areas, and Sierra Leoneans 
scattered throughout rural Liberia and Cote d’Ivoire.  Without local 
languages and the protections of their families even the educated ones 
are vulnerable to the kinds of processes of dependent incorporation just 
described.  In a countryside short of the labour of young people - where 
those who possibly can have sent their own children away to school (and 
in the case of the national elite to expensive schools overseas) - it is 
tempting to see the labour of these young scatterlings as a providential 
gift.  The village patron of a young man like M., or the village polygynist 
“husbands” of the war widows described above, have no incentive to 
trace families or pass on information about reintegration opportunities.  In 
fact, J. knew that in some cases they were doing the opposite - feeding 
their ex-RUF wives or labourers the false information that it was too 
dangerous to contemplate a return home, because young people tainted 
by the movement were supposedly being killed by lynch mobs on the 
street. 
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Grievance begets grievance 
 
We see clearly that “domestic slavery” was less a system of oppression 
by design than the near inevitable result (as anthropologists and 
historians have long recognised) of losing social status and the support 
of a kinship group in conditions of social displacement, especially where 
information spreads slowly, and young, vulnerable people lack education 
or “transferable” skills.  Lack of educational opportunity reproduces a 
“forced” division of labour (as Durkheim so clearly recognised), and in 
turn breeds resentments that feed the “fatalist” violence of the slave 
revolt (Richards & Vlassenroot 2002).  If the evidence from the war in 
Sierra Leone fits the picture of “grievance” not “greed” it is equally clear 
that a “forced” division of labour is also a product of civil war.  Domestic 
slavery and civil war risk subsisting in self-perpetuating cycle. 
 
There is an irony - of course - in a rebellion against “forced labour” 
resulting in a worse situation of “forced labour” for many of the young 
people joining that rebellion (whether with or against their will).  Why the 
RUF was such a failure is open for debate (the global climate was 
inauspicious, it was poorly led, it succumbed to the intrigue of its 
enemies, etc).  It also has to be remarked that “slave” revolts generally 
end in disaster.  But this is not my main point.  The main issue to which I 
draw attention is that if the analysis is correct then the problem of war will 
recur.  The present “peace” in Sierra Leone will only be an interval before 
further outbreaks of perhaps even more inchoate rural violence.  
Fundamental institutional reforms are needed to break the cycle. 
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Conclusion 
 
It has been argued that if we are to understand and deal with war in 
current West Africa we should worry less about unruly urban youth, 
warlords or the perversions of Poro, and more about social and 
institutional factors.  The issues that stand out for Sierra Leone are those 
perpetuating a forced division of labour. Equality of educational 
opportunity (for rural children with weak family support) and the need to 
widen agrarian opportunity structures (e.g. through market reforms and 
access to agro-technology) are basic issues.  It also seems important to 
attend to strengthening the rights of rural migrant labourers and tenant 
farmers.  Customary courts need urgent overhaul.  The powers of 
“traditional” rulers should be regulated by a bill of rights.  Fashionable 
concern with greed or “culture clash” must not obscure the fact that the 
violence of contemporary African war refracts real injustice and tangible 
grievance. 
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